This paper studies backward linear quadratic non-zero sum differential game problem with asymmetric information. Compared with the existing literature, there are two distinct features. One is that the information available to players is asymmetric. The other one is that the system dynamics is described by a backward stochastic differential equation. Nash equilibrium points are obtained for several cases of asymmetric information by stochastic maximum principle and technique of completion square. The systems of some Riccati equations and forward-backward stochastic filtering equations are introduced and the existence and uniqueness of the solutions are proved. Finally, the unique Nash equilibrium point for each case of asymmetric information is represented in a feedback form of the optimal filtering of the state, through the solutions of the Riccati equations.
Introduction
Throughout this article, we denote by R k the k-dimensional Euclidean space, R k×l the collection of k × l matrices. The superscript * denotes the transpose of vectors or matrices. Let (Ω, F, (F t ), P ) be a complete filtered probability space in which F t denotes a natural filtration generated by a three dimensional standard Brownian motion (W 1 (t), W 2 (t), W 3 (t)), F = F T , and T > 0 be a fixed time horizon. For a given Euclidean space, we denote by ·, · (resp. | · |) the scalar product (resp. norm). We also denote by L 2 Ft (0, T ; S) the space of all S-valued, F tadapted and square integrable processes, by L 2 F T (Ω; S) the space of all S-valued, F T -measurable and square integrable random variables, by L 2 (0, T ; S) the space of all S-valued functions sat-isfying T 0 |f (t)| 2 dt < ∞, and by f (t) 2 the square of f (t). For the sake of simplicity, we set F j t σ{W j (s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t} (j = 1, 2, 3), F 
This work is interested in backward linear quadratic (LQ, for short) non-zero sum stochastic differential game with asymmetric information. For simplicity, we only study the case of two players. Let us now begin to specify the problem. Consider the following one-dimensional backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE, for short)
) to denote the dependence of the state on the control variable (v 1 , v 2 ).
Let F t denote the full information up to time t and G i t ⊆ F t be a given sub-filtration which represents the information available to Player i (i = 1, 2) up to time t ∈ [0, T ]. If G i t ⊆ F t and G i t = F t , we call the available information partial or incomplete for Player i. If G 1 t = G 2 t , we call the available information asymmetric for Player 1 and Player 2. Now we introduce the admissible control set Suppose each player hopes to minimize her/his cost functional J i (v 1 (·), v 2 (·)) by selecting a suitable admissible control v i (·) (i = 1, 2). In this study, the problem is, under the setting of asymmetric information, to look for (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) ∈ U 1 × U 2 which is called the Nash equilibrium point of the game, such that
We call the problem above an asymmetric information backward LQ non-zero sum stochastic differential game. For simplicity, we denote it by Problem (AI BLQDE), and denote the state (y u 1 ,u 2 , z ) corresponding to the Nash equilibrium point control (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) by (y, z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ).
The LQ problems constitute an extremely important class of optimal control or differential game problems, since they can model many problems in applications, and also reasonably approximate nonlinear control or game problems. On the other hand, there also exist so called partial and asymmetric information problems in real world. For example, investors only partially know the information from security market (see [3, 24] ); the principal faces information asymmetric and risk with regards to whether the agent has effectively completed a contract, when a principal hires an agent to perform specific duties (see, e.g. [10, 11] ). For more information about LQ control or game problems, the interested readers may refer the following partial list of the works including [4, 8, 9, 14, 19, 25, 26] with complete information, and [6] with partial information, and the references therein.
A BSDE is an Itô's stochastic differential equation (SDE) for which a random terminal condition on the state has been specified. General nonlinear BSDEs, introduced independently by Pardoux and Peng [12] and Duffie and Epstein [2] , have received considerable research attention in recent years and wide applicability in number of different areas, such as stochastic control, differential games, recursive utility, partial differential equations, risk measure, mathematical finance. When we say backward stochastic control or backward differential games problems, we means that systems states are governed by BSDEs. For more information about backward LQ control or game problems, refer to [16, 28] with complete information, and [5, 17] with partial information.
It is very important and meaningful to find explicit Nash equilibrium points for differential game problems. When the available information is partial or asymmetric, we need to derive the corresponding optimal filtering of the states and adjoint variables which will be used to represent the Nash equilibrium points. It is very difficult to obtain the equations satisfied by the optimal filtering when the available information is asymmetric for Player 1 and Player 2. Up till now, it seems that there has been no literature about backward LQ differential games with asymmetric information G 1 t and G 2 t . However, in case where G i t (i = 1, 2) are chosen as certain special forms, we can still derive the filtering equations and then obtain the explicit form of the Nash equilibrium point. In the sequel, we shall study Problem (AI BLQDE) under the following four classes of asymmetric information:
and G 2 t = F 3 t , i.e., the two players possess the mutually independent information. In Section 3, we shall point out that some other cases similar to (i)-(iv) can be also solved by the same idea and method. To our knowledge, this paper is the first try to study backward LQ non-zero sum differential games in the setting of the asymmetric information.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some preliminaries which will be used to derive the forward-backward filtering equations and prove the corresponding existence and uniqueness of the solutions. In Section 3.1, we study a special case of the two players possess the same available information F 2 t , and solve the unique Nash equilibrium point which is represented by a feedback of the optimal filter of the state with respect to F 2 t . In Section 3.2, we obtain the unique explicit Nash equilibrium point for each class of asymmetric information above. We also introduce some Riccati equations and represent the unique Nash equilibrium point in a feedback form of the optimal filtering of the state with respect to the corresponding asymmetric information, through the solutions of the Riccati equations. Some conclusions are given in Section 4.
Preliminary results
In this section, we are going to introduce two lemmas, which will be often used later. First, we present existence and uniqueness for the solutions of the forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE, for short), whose dynamics is described by
Here x(·) satisfies an (forward) SDE, (y(·), z(·)) satisfies a backward stochastic differential equation, W (·) is a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion, (x, (y, z)) takes value in R n ×R n ×R n×d , and b, σ, f, ϕ are the mappings with suitable sizes. We can see that y is specified a terminal condition at T and x is coupled with with y at initial time 0. We set F W t σ{W (s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t} and introduce the notations
and make the following assumption.
(H 1 ) A(t, u) and ϕ are uniformly Lipschitz continuous with respect to their variables; for
We also make the following assumption.
(H 2 ) The functions A(t, u) and ϕ satisfy the monotonic conditions:
where κ 1 , κ 1 and κ 3 are given nonnegative constants satisfying 
Remark 2.1 If we assume σ ≡ 0, ξ and all functions are deterministic, then (5) is reduced to a forward-backward ordinary differential equation (FBODE for short)
We define the notation u = (x, y) * , G(t, u) = (−f, b) * (t, u). If b, f, ϕ and G satisfy the assumptions (H 1 ) and (H 2 ) with L 2
and ϕ is uniformly bounded, then
The following lemma is from the monograph by Chung [1] (see the example, Section 9.2).
Lemma 2.2 If F 1 , F 2 and F 3 are three σ-algebras, and
3 Nash equilibrium point
In this section, we shall derive the explicit form of the Nash equilibrium point for Problem (AI BLQDE), applying stochastic maximum principle for partial information optimal control problem and the technique of complete square. Further, we also introduce the Riccati equations and represent the Nash equilibrium point as a feedback of the optimal filtersŷ,ỹ andȳ, through the solutions to the Riccati equations. Appealing to the stochastic maximum principle for partial information backward stochastic control problems (see [5] ), or partial information nonzero-sum backward stochastic differential games problems (see [17] ), we can derive the following necessary conditions for Problem (AI BLQDE).
is a Nash equilibrium point for Problem (AI BLQDE), then we have
is indeed a Nash equilibrium point for Problem (AI BLQDE).
Proof. For any v 1 (·) ∈ U 1 , we have
where
We apply Itô's formula to x 1 (y v 1 , u 2 − y) and get
Then, because l 1 and r 1 are nonnegative, and m 1 is positive, we have
Similarly, for any v 2 (·) ∈ U 2 , we also have
Therefore, we can conclude that (u 1 , u 2 ) in (8) is a Nash equilibrium point for Problem (AI BLQDE) indeed.
Combining Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, we obtain the following theorem.
is a Nash equilibrium point for Problem (AI BLQDE) if and only if (u 1 , u 2 ) has the form denoted by (8) and (y,
Remark 3.1 If (9) has a unique solution, then Problem (AI BLQDE) has a unique Nash equilibrium point. If (9) has many solutions, then Problem (AI BLQDE) may have many Nash equilibrium points. If (9) has no solution, Problem (AI BLQDE) has no Nash equilibrium point. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium point for Problem (AI BLQDE) is equivalent to the existence and uniqueness of (9).
In the following, we begin to study Problem (AI BLQDE) under several classes of particular asymmetric information. Though the chosen observable information is a bit special, the mathematical deductions are still highly complicated, and the derived results are interesting and meaningful.
In Section 3.1, we consider the particular case where the two players possess the same available information F 2 t , i.e., G 1 t = G 2 t = F 2 t , whose results will be used in the asymmetric information cases in Section 3.2.
The same available information:
In this case, from the notations defined by (1), we have E x 1 (t) G 1 t =x 1 (t) and E x 2 (t) G 2 t = x 2 (t). Then Theorem 3.1 can be rewritten as follows:
is a Nash equilibrium point if and only if (u 1 , u 2 ) has the following form: (11) where (y, z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ), x 1 , x 2 is a solution of the following FBSDE
Using Lemma 5.4 in Xiong [23] to (12), we get the optimal filtering (ỹ,z 1 ,z 2 ,z 3 ),x 1 ,x 2 of (y, z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ), x 1 , x 2 with respect to F 2 t , which is governed by
Note that (13) is not a standard FBSDE because the additional filtering estimatesz 1 andz 3 are involved, then generally its existence and uniqueness are not an immediate result of Lemma 2.1, whose detail proof is postponed and put in Theorem 3.3 in order to make the paper easier to read. We first introduce the systems of ordinary differential equations (ODEs for short)
which will be derived step by step in Theorem 3.3.
Lemma 3.3 Under the assumption (H 3 ), there exists a unique solution (α 1 , β 1 , α 2 , β 2 ) to (14) and (15).
Since (16) is a standard Riccati equation, it has a unique solution α(·). Introduce two auxiliary equationsα
where α is the solution to (16) . Obviously, ODEs (17) and (18) have unique solutionsᾱ 1 andᾱ 2 , respectively. In addition, we can check that α 1 and α 2 in (14a) and (15a) are also the solutions to equations (17) and (18), respectively. From the uniqueness of solutions of equations (17) and (18), it follows thatᾱ 1 = α 1 ,ᾱ 2 = α 2 , which implies in turn that (14a) and (15a) have the unique solutions α 1 and α 2 .
Let β = β 1 + β 2 , then we havė
where α is the solution to equation (16) . Note that ODE (19) has a unique solution β. Introduce two another auxiliary equationṡ
where α 1 , α 2 and β are the solutions to (17) , (18) and (19), respectively. Similarly, we can prove that (14b) and (15b) also have unique solutions β 1 and β 2 satisfyinḡ
Based on the arguments above, we can derive the unique analytical expressions for α 1 , α 2 , β 1 , β 2 , α and β. The proof is completed.
We introduce a standard FBSDE
and an additional assumption as follows.
In the sequel, we set about proving the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4 Under the assumptions (H 3 ) and (H 4 ), equation (22) has a unique solution
Proof. We first introduce another FBSDE      −dp = ap + (b
If (ỹ,z 2 ),x 1 ,x 2 is a solution to (22) , then (n, p, q) is a solution to (23) , where
On the other hand, if (p, q, n) is a solution to (23), we introduce the following stochastic differential equation (SDE for short)
From the existence and uniqueness of SDE, (24) has a unique solution (n 1 , n 2 ) with n 1 + n 2 = n. Further, we can check that (p, q), n 1 , n 2 is a solution to (22) . In other words, the existence and uniqueness of (22) is equivalent to that of (23) . It is easy to check that (23) satisfies the assumptions (H 1 ) and (H 2 ). From Lemma 2.1, it has a unique solution (p, q, n). So does (22) . 
Proof. We will prove the equivalence between (13) and (22) by two steps, which together with Lemma 3.4 implies the existence and uniqueness of (13).
Step 1: The solution ỹ,z 2 ,x 1 ,x 2 of (22) is a solution of (13) .
If there exists a solution ỹ,z 2 ,x 1 ,x 2 to (22), then for the knownx 1 andx 2 , similar to Lemma 3.4, equation (12) has a unique solution (y, z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ), x 1 , x 2 . Noting the terminal condition of (12), we set
Applying Itô's formula to x 1 in (25) subject to (12a), we obtain
Substituting (25) into (12b) and comparing the coefficients between (12b) and (26), we have
Taking E ·|F 2 t on both sides of (25), (27) and (28), it yields
and
Plugging (29) in (31), we derive (14) . Applying Itô's formula to x 2 in (25), similarly we have
Taking E ·|F 2 t on both sides of (32) and (33), it yields
subject to (29). Plugging (29) in (35), we derive (15) . In addition, we can affirm from (30) and (34) that
According to the third equality of (30) and the first equality of (34), it is easy to see that the solution of (22) is a solution of (13).
Step 2: The solution of (13) is a solution of (22) . If there exists a solution ỹ,z 1 ,z 2 ,z 3 ,x 1 ,x 2 to (13), then for the knownx 1 andx 2 , equation (12) still has a unique solution (y, z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ), x 1 , x 2 . As shown in Step 1, we can conclude that
where α 1 and α 2 are the unique solutions of (14) and (15) . Putting (38) into (13), we derive (22) , which means that the solution of (13) is a solution of (22) .
To the end, we are the position to solve the explicit representations of (ỹ,z 1 ,z 2 ,z 3 ),x 1 ,x 2 . Due to (29), (22a) can be rewritten as
Then there exists a unique solutioñ
with Γ s t = exp
r) and α 1 and β = β 1 + β 2 uniquely given by (14) and (15) . Set
Due to (37), (39) can be rewritten as
Further, from (29) and (30) or (29) and (34), the explicit representations of x 1 ,x 2 ,z 1 ,z 2 ,z 3 are derived. Then we have the Nash equilibrium point in the feedback form of the optimal filter y(·) of the state y with respect to F 2 t as follows.
Theorem 3.4 Under the assumptions (H 3 )
and (H 4 ), the unique Nash equilibrium point is denoted by
whereỹ is given by (40), and α i and β i (i = 1, 2) are uniquely determined by (14) and (15).
The asymmetric information
t . In this case, we have E x 1 (t) G 1 t =x 1 (t) and E x 2 (t) G 2 t =x 2 (t). Hereinafter, we simply callx 1 andx 2 the optimal filters of x 1 and x 2 , respectively, if there is no ambiguity from the notations and context. Then Theorem 3.1 can be rewritten as follows:
Theorem 3.5 (u 1 , u 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium point for Problem (AI BLQDE) if and only if (u 1 , u 2 ) has the form of (42) where (y, z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ), x 1 , x 2 is a solution of the following FBSDE
Now it is the position to seek the dynamics ofx 1 (t) andx 2 (t) which will be used to construct the analytical representation of the Nash equilibrium point. Applying Lemma 5.4 in Xiong [23] and Lemma 2.2, we obtain the optimal filtersŷ andx 1 of y and x 1 in (43a) and (43b) with respect to F 1, 2 t for Player 1 which satisfy
wherex 2 (·) in (44a) is given by (29) and (40). Similarly, we can obtain the optimal filtersȳ andx 2 of y and x 2 in (43a) and (43c) with respect to F 2, 3 t for Player 2 which satisfy
wherex 1 (·) in (45a) is given by (29) and (40).
We can see that the additional termẑ 3 (resp.z 1 ) appears in (44) (resp. (45)) which results in the difficulty of proving the existence and uniqueness of solutions. To overcome this, we introduce the ODEs
which are obtained similar to (14) and (15) and have unique solutions (γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 ) and (τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 ).
See also Lemma 3.5 for more detail. In additon, we introduce the standard FBSDEs
which are subject to the additional assumption as follows.
Appealing to Lemma 2.1, under the assumptions (H 3 ) and (H 5 ), (48) and (49) have unique solutions. If we can prove the equivalence between (44)- (45) and (48)-(49), then (44) and (45) have unique solutions (ŷ,ẑ 1 ,ẑ 2 ,ẑ 3 ),x 1 and (ȳ,z 1 ,z 2 ,z 3 ),x 2 , respectively, which is stated as follows.
Lemma 3.5 If the assumptions (H 3 )-(H 5 ) hold, there exist the unique solutions (ŷ,ẑ 1 ,ẑ 2 , z 3 ),x 1 and (ȳ,z 1 ,z 2 ,z 3 ),x 2 to (44) and (45), respectively.
Proof. The equivalence between (44)- (45) and (48)- (49) is proved by two steps.
Step 1: A solution of (44)- (45) is a solution of (48)-(49).
If (44) and (45) have solutions (ŷ,ẑ 1 ,ẑ 2 ,ẑ 3 ),x 1 and (ȳ,z 1 ,z 2 ,z 3 ),x 2 , we can see thatx 1 andx 2 are dependent onx 2 andx 1 , respectively. Due tox i = α iỹ + β i (i = 1, 2) from Section 3.1,x 1 andx 2 are dependent onỹ. After we plugx 1 andx 2 into (43), according to Lemma 2.1 and the initial conditions, (43) has a unique solution (y, z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ), , x 1 , x 2 with x 1 and x 2 depending on both y andỹ. So we set
with γ 1 (0) = −r 1 , γ 2 (0) = 0, γ 3 (0) = 0, τ 1 (0) = −r 2 , τ 2 (0) = 0, τ 3 (0) = 0, y andỹ satisfying (43a) and (41). Applying Itô's formula to x 1 in (50), we have
Comparing the drift and diffusion coefficients between (43b) and (52), we conclude that
Taking E · F 1, 2 t on (50), (53) and (54), we havê
Then (46) is obtained from (57). Substitutingẑ 3 denoted by (56) into (44), we derive (48). Applying Itô's formula to x 2 in (51), comparing the coefficients of equations and taking
, we can similarly obtainx
Then (57) is derived from (60). Substitutingz 1 denoted by (59) into (45), we derive (49). So A solution of (44)- (45) is a solution of (48)-(49).
Step 2: A solution of (48)- (49) is a solution of (44)-(45). We assume that (48) and (49) have solutions (ŷ,ẑ 1 ,ẑ 2 ),x 1 and (ȳ,z 2 ,z 3 ),x 2 . Then (43) has a unique solution (y, z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ), x 1 , x 2 for the knownx 1 andx 2 . Similar to Step 1, we can derive the relation:
which implies (44) and (45) hold, i.e., a solution of (48)- (49) is a solution of (44)-(45).
We set
Due to (29), (55) and (56), (48a) can be rewritten as
which has a unique solutionŷ
with Υ s t = exp
Due to (29), (58) and (59), (49a) can be rewritten as
which has a unique solutionȳ
with Ψ s t = exp
. Based on the arguments above, we derive the Nash equilibrium point which is represented in the feedback of the optimal filtersŷ,ȳ andỹ of the state y. Then Theorem 3.5 can be rewritten as follows. Theorem 3.6 Under the assumption (H 3 )-(H 5 ), Problem (AI BLQDE) has a unique Nash equilibrium point denoted by
and G 2 t = F 2 t . In this case, we have E y 1 (t)|G 1 t =ŷ 1 (t) and E y 2 (t)|G 2 t =ỹ 2 (t). Applying the similar methods shown in Section 3.2.1, we can obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7 (u 1 , u 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium point for Problem (AI BLQDE) if and only if
where (y, z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ), x 1 , x 2 is a solution of the following FBSDE
Under the assumptions (H 3 )-(H 5 ), we can check that the filtering equations (13), (44) and the linear relations (29) and (55) still hold, and the systems of equations (14), (15) and (46) are still uniquely solvable. Then we have the following theorem. > 0, then Problem (AI BLQDE) has a unique Nash equilibrium point denoted by
, whereỹ andŷ are shown in (40) and (65), respectively. and
and G 2 t = F 1 t , the corresponding results can be easily derived.
3.2.3
G 1 t = F t and G 2 t = F 2 t . In this case, we have E x 1 (t)|G 1 t = x 1 (t) and E x 2 (t)|G 2 t =x 2 (t). Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.9 (u 1 , u 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium point for Problem (AI BLQDE) if and only if
Under the assumptions (H 3 )-(H 4 ), we can check that ỹ,z 1 ,z 2 ,z 3 ),x 1 ,x 2 ) still satisfies (13) . From Section 3.1, we know thatỹ is shown as (40) andx 2 is uniquely represented by (29). Then (73a) and (73b) can be rewritten as
Theorem 3.11 (u 1 , u 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium point for Problem (AI BLQDE) if and only if
Using the similar method shown in Section 3.2.1, we obtain the optimal filters of y and x 1 in (78a) and (78b) with respect to F 
y(T ) =ξ,x 1 (0) = −r 1ŷ (0).
Here we denote by Eη the mathematical expectation E η(t) of the variable η(t) and omit t for simplicity. Similarly, we can obtain the optimal filters of x and y 2 in (78a) and (78c) with respect to 
Ey(T ) = Eξ, Ex 1 (0) = −r 1 Ey(0), Ex 2 (0) = −r 2 Ey(0),
whereĖη denotes dE(η(t)) dt for η = y, x 1 , x 2 . It is clear that (81) is an FBODE independent of (79) and (80). Using the similar method shown in Lemma 3.4 and Remark 2.1, we conclude that (81) has a unique solution (Ey, Ex 1 , Ex 2 ) under the assumption (H 3 ). Plugging the solutions Ex 2 and Ex 1 into (79) and (80) respectively and applying Lemma 2.1, we conclude that (79) and (80) have the unique solutions (ŷ,ẑ 1 ,ẑ 2 ),x 1 and (y,ž 3 ),x 2 , respectively. Then we derive the more explicit representation of the Nash equilibrium point in (77) as follows. Theorem 3.12 Under the assumption (H 3 ), Problem (AI BLQDE) has a unique Nash equilibrium point denoted by u 1 (t) = m −1 1 (t)b 1 (t)x 1 (t), u 2 (t) = m −1 2 (t)b 2 (t)x 2 (t), wherex 1 andx 2 are uniquely determined by the systems of equations (79)-(81).
In the sequel, we only present the results and omit the deduction procedures, because the method and technique are parallel to those in Section 3.2.1.
The relation between Ex i and Ey is as follows:
where α i , β i , α and β are the unique solutions to the systems of equations (14)- (16) and (19) with f i (·) (i = 1, 2, 3) replaced by 0, and Ey(t) = Γ 1 (r)α(r) dr . The relation betweenx 1 and (ŷ, Ey) is as follows: 2 β 2 + c. The relation betweenx 2 and (y, Ey) is as follows: 
